Rapid response systems (RRS) in hospitals in Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) have been present for more than 20 years but governance of the efferent limb-the rapid response team (RRT)-has not been previously reported in detail. The objectives of this study were to describe current governance arrangements for RRTs within ANZ and contrast those against expected implementation, using the Australian Commission for Safety and Quality in Health Care National Standard 9 (S9) as a benchmark. Assessment focused on S9 subclauses 9.1.1 (governance and oversight), 9.1.2 (RRT implementation), 9.2.3 (data collection and dissemination), 9.2.4 (quality improvement), 9.5.2 (call reviews), 9.6.1 and 9.6.2 (basic and advanced life support [ALS] skill set). We identified public and private hospitals across ANZ from government-maintained registers. Those reasonably expected to have an RRT were contacted and invited to participate. Responses were obtained via an online anonymised questionnaire. Three hundred and forty-two hospitals were contacted, of whom 284 (83.0%) responded. Two hundred and thirty-two hospitals submitted data, and the other 52 declined to participate or did not have an RRT. In hospitals with an intensive care unit (ICU), intensivist attendance at RRT calls occurred less often outside office hours (odds ratio, OR, 0.49, 95% confidence interval, CI, 0.32 to 0.75]). Where intensivists were not on the RRT, consultation with them about calls also occurred less often outside office hours (OR 0.39, 95% CI 0.22 to 0.66). Consultation with patients' admitting specialists occurred more often during office hours versus out of hours RRT calls and in private versus public hospitals. The presence of ICU staff on the RRT decreased the likelihood of admitting specialists being consulted about RRT calls (OR 0.66, 95% CI 0.47 to 0.93). Most hospitals maintained databases of RRT calls and regularly audited RRT activity (92% and 90% respectively). However, most (63.7%) did not make that information available beyond their hospital or local network. We concluded that the majority of hospitals in the ANZ region had governance mechanisms for their RRT. However, there was a notable lack of consistency, especially around specialist involvement and audit processes. Although some findings from this study are reassuring, there is still potential for improvement. Further development of guidelines and the establishment of a regional RRS database may assist with achieving this.
The rapid response team (RRT) has become a standard and expected service in acute hospitals across Australia and New Zealand (ANZ) 1 . It ideally comprises high-performing clinicians with advanced knowledge and clinical skills who can effectively manage deteriorating patients. However, team composition, level of experience, and specialties represented has been noted to vary between hospitals 2 . While the effect of RRTs on patient morbidity and mortality has not been clearly established [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] , the incidence of RRT calls has nonetheless increased year-on-year [7] [8] [9] [10] . As of 2013, more than 14,700 patients were subject to RRT calls annually in Australia [7] [8] [9] [10] . In light of this, RRT governance is a crucial component of a rapid response system (RRS) to ensure quality assurance and maintenance of healthcare standards.
In Australia, National Safety and Quality Health Service Standard 9 (S9) provides guidance for the governance and operation of hospital systems to recognise and respond to clinical deterioration 10 . Although New Zealand currently has no formal directive, district health boards still monitor RRT activity and report quarterly to the Federal Ministry of Health (email communication, A. Psirides, 1 March 2017). These support the need for robust frameworks to support development of RRSs, dictate minimum skill sets for clinicians attending calls, and stipulate data collection and audit.
To date, the implementation of governance and adherence to best practices across ANZ has not been thoroughly evaluated, nor is such data available for information and benchmarking purposes. This investigation was therefore conducted as a quality initiative.
Methods

Study design
This was an audit and exploration of current RRT governance practices across ANZ. S9 resources produced by the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care were used as a reference for aspects of RRT governance and service quality that the study would examine. These included: • subclause 9.1.1: "governance arrangements are in place to support the development, implementation, and maintenance of organisation-wide…response systems". • 9.1.2: "…establishment of a rapid response system".
• 9.2.3: "data collected about…response systems are provided to the clinical workforce…". • 9.2.4: "action is taken to improve the…effectiveness of the…response system". • 9.5.2: "the circumstances and outcomes of calls…are regularly reviewed". • 9.6.1: "the clinical workforce is…proficient in basic life support". • 9.6.2: "…at least one clinician, either on site or in close proximity…can practice advanced life support". Patients triggering a rapid response call have the potential to deteriorate rapidly and the input of an experienced clinician could be critical to a positive outcome for the patient. Therefore, information on composition of hospital RRTs, level of supervision or involvement of senior clinicians, and audit processes was collected.
Setting/participants
Hospitals in Australia were identified from state and territory Department of Health websites, and the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare website: www.myhospitals. gov.au. Hospitals in New Zealand were identified through Ministry of Health website listings (Appendix 1). Those with only paediatric or psychiatric inpatients, day surgery facilities, or fewer than 30 inpatient beds, were assumed to be unlikely to have a formal RRT and excluded.
Data collection
Between November 2015 and January 2016, eligible hospitals were contacted by electronic mail on a staggered basis by state or district, and invited to participate. Each was requested to nominate an RRS representative to complete an online questionnaire (Appendix 2). This comprised 31 questions, divided into sections on RRT demographics, oversight, skill mix, audit or follow-up as well as incident management. Participants were not required to identify their organisation or individual personnel. Responses were either binary (yes, no), on a five-point Likert scale, or chosen from pre-populated lists. Free text entries were accepted if none of the available options were applicable. Responses were sought as factual and opinions were not canvassed.
Subsequent reminder emails were sent at three weeks and six weeks from the initial email. All correspondence was conducted by one of the authors (SS) to ensure consistency.
Data analysis
Descriptive and Likert item data are presented as frequencies and percentages. Likert item responses were compared by ordinal regression with subsequent generation of parameter estimates. These are reported as odds ratios (OR) and 95% confidence intervals (95% CI). Statistical analyses were conducted with SPSS Statistics software (IBM Corp, IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 24.0. Armonk, NY, USA). A P-value of less than 0.05 was considered significant.
Ethics
The need for formal ethics approval was waived by the chairman of the Human Research Ethics Committee (TQEH/ LMH/MH) on the basis of a quality assurance exercise. Consent was implied by participating sites voluntarily submitting data.
Results
In total, 516 hospitals were screened. From these, 342 (66.3%) hospitals met inclusion criteria and were contacted. Responses were received from 284 (83.0%). Of these, 47 (16.5%) reported not having an RRT, three (1.1%) declined to participate and two (0.7%) were in the process of closing down.
Of the 232 participating hospitals, 202 (87.1%) were located in Australia and 30 (12.9%) in New Zealand (Appendix 3). The majority (162 [69.8%]) were public hospitals. There were 154 (66.4%) hospitals with an intensive care unit (ICU). Most hospitals (165 [71.1%]) reported having a specific RRS coordinator, however in only 51 (22%) was that their primary role. Leadership of the RRT was provided by ICU specialists in 17 (7.3%) hospitals. Of the remaining RRTs, 74 (31.9%) had ICU trainees, 61 (26.3%) general medical trainees and 22 (9.5%) other non-specialist doctors in this role. Nursing staff led the team in 51 (22%) hospitals, which included 30 in which medical officers were also rostered to the RRT. In 19 of the hospitals with a nurse team leader, these staff were not ICU trained nor was there an ICU on site. Seven hospitals did not have a pre-defined team leader role (Appendix 4).
RRT composition
Of the 154 hospitals with an ICU, five (3.2%) did not roster any ICU staff to their RRT. There were 22 (14.3%) hospitals in which ICU specialists always or mostly attended RRT calls during standard office hours (in-hours) and 12 (7.8%) where this also occurred outside office hours (out of hours). Fourteen (17.9%) of the 78 hospitals without an ICU reported having critical care-trained staff attend RRT calls, albeit in seven hospitals this did not include a doctor. In 38 hospitals, the RRT included at least one non-ICU specialist, mostly from anaesthesia or medicine.
Operational oversight
There were 126 hospitals with non-specialist ICU representation on their RRT. In 71 (56.3%) of these, ICU specialists were always or mostly consulted regarding RRT calls during standard working hours and 47 (37.3%) where this also occurred out of hours. ICU specialists were less likely to be informed about RRT calls out of hours than during standard working hours (OR 0.39, 95% CI 0.22 to 0.66, P <0.01).
Home-team specialists (i.e. the senior clinician under whose name and responsibility the patient was admitted) were always or mostly consulted about RRT calls on their patients in 162 (73.6%) hospitals during standard working hours and in 107 (48.6%) out of hours. Overall, home-team specialists were significantly less likely to be informed about RRT calls on their patients out of hours versus during office hours (OR 0.44, 95% CI 0.31 to 0.62, P <0.01). Where calling the hometeam specialist was not standard practice, other specialists or equivalent practitioners were often involved instead. In nine hospitals, it was an anaesthetist, in nine an emergency physician, in nine a general physician, and seven rural hospitals had the duty general practitioner covering RRT calls.
Consultation with the home-team specialist was far more common in private versus public hospitals ( 
Missing data
From all submissions received, there were 6,502 potential data points, of which 209 were unfilled (3.2%). The median number of missing responses per question was 14 (interquartile range, IQR 6 to 18), minimum 0 and maximum 20. All respondents answered the first eight questions of the questionnaire, and there were 212 submissions with a response to every question.
Discussion
Summary of key findings
This broad investigation into governance across ANZ found that oversight and audit processes were well embedded in the majority of participating RRSs. However, there appeared to be considerable variability in delivery and implementation of these, especially around specialist involvement. This may in part have been due to heterogeneity of the hospitals involved. But it could also be explained by a lack of detailed standardised guidance, especially around team composition, departmental representation or involvement of senior clinicians.
Specialist oversight of RRT activity
Although the majority of hospitals reported routine home-team specialist involvement for patients attended by an RRT, this was not universal and occurred mostly during standard working hours. However, it does show improvement by comparison to previous reports. A survey of intensive care trainees conducted in 2007 found there was little or no senior supervision of medical emergency team (MET) activations. In the later MET-CORE investigation of RRT composition, only one out of 39 sites reported regular consultant participation in RRT calls 2 .
The presence of ICU clinicians on RRTs significantly reduced the likelihood of a patient's home-team specialist being contacted. This is likely due to a culture of vertical hierarchy structures and potential reluctance for crossdivisional liaison 11, 12 . From an accountability and responsibility perspective, it is appropriate that the responsible clinician be informed of clinical deterioration in their patient and be involved in management decision-making.
Where this is not possible or feasible, involvement of another experienced clinician would be an acceptable compromise. This was reflected in this study's findings with other disciplines, such as emergency or general medicine, often being available to RRTs for consultation instead.
A significant finding was that in a quarter of hospitals with an RRS, home-team specialists were not informed of what are likely major events even during standard working hours. This number doubles out of hours. A potential explanation for this could be a high number of perceived false alarms which do not require senior notification. More concerningly, other possible explanations include the responsible clinician not being contacted due to other factors such as unavailability, reluctance to contact senior clinicians by the RRT, or decisions being made by other members of the home-team or RRT.
Overall, this study found far lower levels of supervision of RRT activity outside normal working hours whether it was by immediate specialist presence or by consultation with other relevant specialists. This is concerning as RRT activity occurs at a similar frequency and at similar levels of acuity at any hour 13, 14 . Given the high-risk nature of deteriorations that trigger RRT calls, and the potential for adverse events, universal senior level consultation would seem reasonable. However, the potential downside of this could be the increased use of senior resources with possible little gain to be had. A sentinel finding was the level of ICU specialist involvement in RRT activations. A number of hospitals reported their immediate presence at calls as routine practice, including outside normal working hours in some centres. Prior investigations only reported very low or no engagement of this type 2, 15 . So it would seem that in the interim, RRS has been prioritised to some degree by intensivists. This is an appropriate practice change, reflecting the need to have appropriately skilled and senior clinicians attend patients at the time of clinical crisis 16 . This is an interesting finding, and the effect on patient outcomes from the presence of experienced ICU clinicians at rapid response calls could be the basis of subsequent investigation 17, 18 .
Auditing of RRT activity
A consistent experience is of RRT activity increasing over time 7, 9 and hence there is a need for ongoing monitoring and quality improvement 10, 16, 19 . This is important to optimise efficiency and performance of RRTs as well as justify appropriate budgeting and sustainability.
Therefore, it is reassuring that the majority of hospitals participating in this study maintained RRT call databases, regularly audited activity and had a formal review mechanism. This is in keeping with the recommendations provided by Standard 9 in regard to the collection of information about RRSs, provision of feedback to the clinical workforce, as well as tracking outcomes and changes in performance over time. At the majority of hospitals, results were distributed within that facility which is important for transparency and feedback.
Despite this, only a small proportion of hospitals released results outside their facility. This data could be pooled by state or district health departments for the purposes of quality assurance and consistency. However, to date there is no unified repository of RRT data akin to the Adult Patient Database maintained by the Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society.
Team member skill mix
In the majority of participating hospitals, at least one member of the RRT was ALS trained, concordant with authority recommendations 10, 16 . Although it should be noted that in less than half of these was this routinely from Australian Resuscitation Council or New Zealand Resuscitation Council accredited courses and no requirements were stipulated on currency or frequency of training. Many hospitals also rostered staff to RRT with at least six months of anaesthetic airway experience. While it is reassuring that skilled staff were on most RRTs, in the absence of uniform training standards, consistency of competence and care delivery cannot be assured.
Strengths and limitations
This study achieved a high response rate (83%). This was attributed to careful screening of sites with an RRT, identification of an appropriate representative for each, guarantees of anonymity for organisations and individuals, and the online nature of the questionnaire. This has permitted collection of a comprehensive and robust dataset, representative of current operations and implementation of governance across ANZ.
There are some potential limitations to this study. Firstly, due to the need for anonymity as well as the electronic capture method, duplication of data submission from any site could not be excluded. Individual hospital demographics and characteristics, that might permit their identification, were not captured. Although the absence of this data precluded performing adjusted analyses, the guarantee of anonymity was felt more important to encourage participation. That the majority of eligible centres provided comprehensive responses to questions on sensitive governance matters reflects this. Not all respondents completed the questionnaire in its entirety, however the majority of the sites (91.4%) provided all data requested. Although full details regarding differences in RRT team composition between out of hours and business hours were not collected, the questionnaire did capture whether ICU specialist attendance differed. Furthermore, it is a reasonable expectation that RRT non-specialist staffing would be consistent around the clock. Finally, assumptions were made regarding the veracity and accuracy of data submitted as the collection method did not permit verification.
Potential future avenues
Since call acuity and activity occurs at similar levels out of hours as during standard hours 13, 14 , the level of RRT oversight should be similar regardless of time of day. Specialist involvement could be reasonably expected for all RRT calls to ensure experienced decision-making and appropriate supervision. This can be achieved via encouragement of junior staff to obtain advice during calls as well as engagement by specialists in RRT activity. Certainly, from an accountability standpoint, it seems sensible to have the care of acutely unwell patients overseen by senior clinicians, even if this is by remote consultation.
As RRT activity becomes more prevalent, the need for auditing of RRT activity becomes ever more important. Collection of outcome and incident data from calls should be regularly reviewed, preferably by a dedicated RRT committee, as already occurs in many centres. It would also seem timely for all RRT data across ANZ to be centrally pooled for research, benchmarking and wider assurance purposes 16 . Current guidance around RRS governance, such as that in clause 9.1 of the Australian Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care statement on the 'deteriorating patient', is somewhat overarching 10 . While it is appreciated that this is by necessity to accommodate heterogeneity amongst hospitals' resourcing and configuration, it permits inconsistency as evidenced by the findings of this paper. Some clearer requirements or provisions, especially in regard to auditing and reporting of RRT activity, could be achievable and assist hospitals maintain high standards of clinical care.
Skills and competencies should be standardised across RRTs, along with frequency of education and training 16 . As a bare minimum, mandatory yearly basic life support training could be reasonably expected for every RRT member 19 . Furthermore, ALS accreditation for those leading RRTs could be achieved through commission of training courses through a recognised organisation 21 . In the future, ratified RRT training, as a component of College requirements or professional development maintenance, would ensure benchmarking and consistency of expected care delivery to RRT attended patients.
Conclusion
The majority of participating hospitals had well embedded and appropriate governance over their RRTs. However, significant variance existed both within and between sites, even allowing for organisational heterogeneity. This is notable in regard to degree of senior involvement in RRT activity, especially outside standard hours. Although many findings from this audit are reassuring, there is still room for improvement around consistency of service delivery and training, as well as the potential to develop a centralised RRS data registry.
